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The Six Billion Kina Answer
At a recent Australian National University workshop, 
a speaker claimed that China’s Export-Import (Exim) 
Bank had offered a 10 billion kina loan to Papua 
New Guinea (PNG), and that this had materialised 
in the form of a six billion kina loan to rebuild the 
Highlands Highway. In 2012, I wrote the Six Billion 
Kina Question, wondering what was likely to come of 
this loan. The story of this loan — which three years 
later is still a chimera — is the subject of this In Brief. 
The backstory reveals much about how infrastructure 
projects are developed in PNG and how Chinese aid 
is delivered in the Pacific. As PNG is now China’s 
largest trading partner (MOFCOM 19/2/2015) in 
the Pacific (overtaking the Marshall Islands in 2014), 
it also has relevance for Australian companies that 
are in competition with Chinese contractors to win 
infrastructure projects in the Pacific. One Australian 
company had its own plan to rebuild and maintain the 
Highlands Highway; a proposal abandoned when the 
loan was announced.
The Election and the Loan
During the 2012 election campaign, Prime Minister 
Peter O’Neill and Minister for Works Francis Awesa 
did the rounds of media outlets, announcing that 
they had secured a 30-year, six billion kina loan from 
China Exim Bank to rebuild the Highlands Highway. 
In a Radio Australia interview, Awesa announced 
that during a visit to Beijing they had been told ‘any 
amount up to $US 10 billion we are more than happy 
to give’ (Radio Australia 14/6/2012). The impression 
that the loan had been signed off at the highest level 
was reinforced in September when Peter O’Neill was 
photographed in China with Premier Li Keqiang and 
Zhu Hongjie, the vice president of China Exim Bank, 
who had led Exim’s 2006 visits to PNG and Fiji. But 
in this and subsequent interviews it was unclear why 
China would agree to hand over such a substantial 
sum, given that China’s 2006 loan facility to the entire 
Pacific was just US$492 million, and had only been 
slowly taken up.
After the election the PNG government continued 
to promote the loan, with Awesa promising on 
28 September 2012 that it would be finalised within a 
month and funds would be available six months later 
(Radio Australia 28/9/2012). Suspiciously, the only 
reference to the loan in Chinese was translations of 
PNG press reports. Projects that were to be funded 
by the loan mushroomed to include a hydropower 
scheme, urbanisation in Port Moresby and Lae, and 
even the upgrading of PNG’s state-owned enterprises. 
China Railway International (CRI) wasted no time in 
announcing its success, with the website of the China 
International Contractors Association carrying news 
that an engineering, procurement and construction 
contract for phase one of the Lae–Nadzab Road had 
been signed on 25 September 2013. The value of the 
project was given as US$132 million, but the financing 
source was not identified (Yuan and Liu 11/10/2013).
This promised six billion kina loan was superseded 
when US$1 billion in concessional loans for the South 
Pacific was announced by Vice Premier Wang Yang in 
November 2013, but it remains linked to two sections 
of the Highlands Highway: an upgrade of the Lae to 
Nadzab section by CRI,1 and a 20 km road between 
Togoba and Kisenopoi Junction, built by China 
Machinery Engineering Corporation. To date, no 
Chinese funds have materialised, and CRI looks set to 
lose the contract for the Lae–Nadzab Road.
Promises and Bureaucratic Realities
In attempting to trace the origin of the loan, it became 
apparent that the central ministries meant to oversee 
PNG’s development finance were in the dark. At the 
Department of National Planning and Monitoring, 
tasked with coordinating donors, officials offered that 
they did their best to guide loans, but ‘it just goes 
beyond us … China and Japan respond to politicians 
because of the absence of a clear aid policy. China 
prefers to work the way it does, they make agreements 
outside the normal process, and then after everything 
is agreed, they bring it to our budget process. Most of 
these projects are agreed at the higher levels — they 
approach the [Chinese] economic counsellor.2 When 
the bosses say do that, we have to do it.’3
At Treasury, tasked with managing PNG’s external 
debt, similar levels of bemusement were expressed. In 
PNG’s 2015 budget estimates the only documented 
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use of a China Exim Bank loan for roads is 183.5 
million kina for upgrading Port Moresby’s streets. 
Only PNG’s contribution to the Lae–Nadzab and 
Togoba–Kisenopoi roads is listed. While resigned to 
the fact that China Exim loans were tied to Chinese 
contractors, officials expressed concern that the 
bidding process for these projects was opaque. The 
size — and existence — of the loan is also unclear. As 
PNG Treasurer Don Polye explained, ‘I haven’t signed 
any loan contracts so I don’t know where all this 
information is coming from. The Treasury signs loans. 
I haven’t signed any.’ On the 800 million kina loan for 
the Lae–Nadzab road, Polye continued ‘[The] Works 
Minister will always say it, other ministers will always 
say it … Just because that’s how much you need, 
doesn’t mean that you’re going to get all this’ (Nalu 
7/11/2013). On 4 October 2013, Peter O’Neill directed 
Chief Secretary Sir Manasupe Zurenuoc to appoint an 
independent team to assess the pricing of these two 
road projects, which found that the cost of the Lae–
Nadzab section was ‘unnecessarily high’.
In interviews with officials from the Department 
of Works and the Department of Transport, it became 
clear that these line ministries and Chinese companies 
were the driving force behind the ‘loan’. In May 2012, 
officials from the two departments met in Beijing 
with representatives of China Exim Bank (two Exim 
Bank employees are responsible for the entire Pacific 
region), but the bulk of the PNG officials’ time was 
spent with the companies. It is probable that the 
Chinese contractors, rather than China Exim Bank, 
put the 10 billion kina figure forward.
Reverse-Engineered Aid
Chinese contractors influence China’s aid program in 
the Pacific, collaborating closely with local politicians 
or project brokers (not always local) to reverse 
engineer projects that are then presented to China’s 
development financial bodies and aid policymakers as 
local initiatives (Smith et al. 2014). The two projects 
related to the phantom (but timely, in electoral terms) 
loan demonstrate that well-organised government 
departments and entrepreneurial bureaucrats can 
also play a role. Both the Department of Works and 
the Department of Transport have been active in 
engaging with development partners: the Transport 
and Infrastructure Sector Monitoring Implementation 
Committee meets regularly and is the most effective 
donor coordination body in PNG.
Given PNG’s vast infrastructure needs, evidence of 
bureaucratic initiative is welcome. But coupled with 
political pressures to get projects completed within a 
single electoral cycle, and the weaknesses of agencies 
charged with the oversight of development finance — 
particularly the Department of National Planning and 
Monitoring and the Central Supply and Tenders Board 
— PNG may find itself short-changed.
Author Notes
Graeme Smith is a fellow with SSGM.
Endnotes
1 On the basis of an agreement of 30 September 2013, 
signed five days after CRI won the contract, much 
of the project will be undertaken by China Railway 
Eryuan Engineering Group, based in Sichuan. Such 
outsourcing is common, although rarely made explicit 
to the PNG side.
2 Economic counsellors are in-country representatives 
of China’s Ministry of Commerce, and oversee China’s 
aid, trade and investment.
3 Author’s interviews, Port Moresby, February 2014.
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